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DISCUSSION KICK-OFF
Innovations in 
Pharmaceutical Industry
How to Work Towards a Global Benefit for 
Consumers
Intellectual Property Laws across the world is intended to 
provide incentives to creators, authors, innovators and 
businesses by granting them monopoly rights usually for a 
limited period. Those rights would reward their efforts, help 
recoup their investments and profit from their contributions 
to society. However, due to inconsistencies and loopholes in 
law coupled with the ineffectiveness or challenges in 
enforcement, society suffers from certain monopolistic, 
controversial and certain unfair trade practices; a few of 

which are highlighted below to propose an effort to address 
the issues and work towards balanced solutions.
The dilemma facing patients – both in the developing and the 
developed world – can be linked more specifically to the 
patent law controversy emanating from the US and 
impacting societies. Many large pharmaceutical companies, 
including drug companies in the US, have been accused of 
denying generic drugs in the US and elsewhere to needy 
consumers, indulging in price gouging, appearing to 
disengage with the needs of the patients in third world 
countries and being overzealous in their efforts to protect 
their intellectual property rights by trying to extend the 
reach and validity of their patents globally. Incremental 
patenting to extend the validity of patents is a way adopted 
to keep some drugs away from becoming generic and more 
freely available.
Prices of life-saving drugs
Arbitrary and huge increase in the prices of life saving drugs 
– with the primary objective of short-term profit 
maximization – is one very controversial way consumers are 
denied what they should be entitled to. US Patent law in 
general provides creators of novel, non-obvious and useful 
products with a 20 year monopoly during which no one else 
can, except with the permission of the creator, produce and 
profit from such creations. WTO member states have to 
provide patent protection for any invention, whether a 
product (such as a medicine) or a process (such as producing 
the chemical ingredients for a medicine), while allowing 
certain exceptions- according to Article 27.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Article 33 of TRIPS also provides that Patent 
protection has to last at least 20 years from the date the 
patent application was filed. On expiry of the protection the 
inventions become generic and go into public domain. New 
drugs, formulations and compounds are covered by utility 
patents and the period of protection starts from the date of 
First-to-File worldwide (earlier at the date of First-to-Invent 
in the US). Understandably, even if not agreeably, owners of 
such drug patents are driven to make the most return on 
investment in this first period.
Price Gouging – the Example of Daraprim 
It is often claimed that pharmaceutical companies spend at 
least a billion dollars for any drug to make it through the long 
road from creation through testing, trials and to the 
consumers. Return on investment and the intent to maximize 
their profits within the protected time period is indeed the 
economic raison d’être. Recent news of Turing 
Pharmaceuticals increasing the price of Daraprim, used to 
treat toxoplasmosis, a life threatening condition affecting 
HIV patients, by 5000%, from $13.50 to $750 per pill has been 
controversial to say the least. Meanwhile, even when his 
company earlier agreed to cut prices by 50% for hospitals 
that handle about 80% of cases treated with Daraprim, it 
remains available in Europe for less than $1. Price gouging 
happens not just in developed countries like the US and 
surely with more impact would negatively affect developing 
and under-developed countries that do not have the means 
to make available such drugs for consumers in dire need.
Consequences for Developing Countries 
We find a broad debates regarding price gouging and the 
claims about weak patent legislations and lax enforcement of 
patent rights in developing countries like India and China. At 
the same time, is the reality that many such life-saving drugs 
are urgently needed in these countries and other least 
developed countries, but unaffordable given their cost. The 
non-affordability of such expensive patented drugs is 
worsened by the acute absence of paid or free medical 
insurance coverage. Stands such as the one taken by Bayer’s 
CEO Marjin Dekkers in 2014, when he declared that the 
cancer drug Nexavar was made for rich westerners and not 
for poor Indians, suggest that corporate greed ultimately 
rules over consumer needs – a deplorable goal of 
pharmaceutical companies.
Possible Solutions 
There are potentially two ways to counter unfair price 
gouging – by true competition, allowing the market 
determine true prices for the drugs, or by legislative price 
controls and more effective regulation that provides 
transparency and prevent unfair trade practices. Imprimis 
Pharmaceuticals’ announcement to create a Daraprim 
alternative that is a compound using active generic 
ingredients would cost patients only $1 a pill. This 
competitive outcome, is a potent and quick way to counter 
and help treat the life threatening Toxoplasma infection that 
severely affects pregnant women and immune-compromised 
AIDS patients. However if the generic drug has to be 
acceptable for consumers, it needs to be FDA approved.
Another strategy to deal with this issue in emerging 
countries keen to provide life-saving drugs for their people, 
is the adoption of compulsory licensing invoked by the 
government to control costs and counter denial to those in 
need. Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement provides for the 
mechanism of compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals and 
medicine, meaning that the patented product may be 
produced without consent of the patent owner. The 
compulsory licenses may be obtained not only to supply in 
general the domestic market of countries that are among the 
least developed, but also under certain conditions for export 
to other countries that do not have production capacity. 
Normally, compulsory licenses can be granted by countries 
after their declaration to do so, subject to conditions listed 
under Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement. This includes the 
need for the person or company in the WTO member 
country to negotiate a voluntary license first with the patent 
holder on reasonable commercial terms. Only if such 
negotiations fail a compulsory license may be issued, after 
which the patent holder has to receive a payment of 
adequate remuneration. In the case of ‘national emergencies’, 
‘other circumstances of extreme urgency’ or ‘public 
commercial use’, there is no need to try negotiating a 
voluntary license before seeking a compulsory license.
The market forces of demand and supply may indeed bode 
well when companies acknowledge the reality of the 
burgeoning middle income markets in countries like India, 
China and other developing countries, where competitive 
price policies would help reap returns while meeting the 
genuine and immediate needs of its consumers. With the 
growing reality of compulsory licensing that has been 
adopted by some WTO member states like India, it makes 
business sense for pharmaceutical companies to have an 
equitable approach to voluntarily licensing the drugs in 
question. Providing those consumers in need with prices 
lower that what they are charged for countries like the US, 
can still contribute to the return on investment given the 
larger volume of sales.
Looking at the initial investment in research and 
development, it is also argued that the claims of high 
expenditure for innovation are often grossly inflated. This if 
proven would undermine the argument of the threat to 
innovation posed to the industry. In that light, there is 
apparent need for transparent mechanisms to measure 
expenditure and ensure the reasonableness of the rewards 
sough in return for such innovation.
Conclusions
The dispute about accessibility of life-saving drugs, especially 
for consumers in developing countries, belongs to the most 
vehement and complex questions in today’s world – touching 
upon issues of intellectual property, reasonable demands 
from society towards private companies, and global justice 
demands. There might be no easy reconciliation between 
companies’ business interests and the claims of patients, but 
as has been shown in this contribution, international law 
offers some ways to mediate the two.
Most importantly, the lack of regulations to control price 
gouging and arbitrary extension of patents and ensure 
transparency of manufacturing processes, costing and 
market mechanisms need to be addressed. To strengthen the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and similar 
agencies worldwide, and to promote legislative action to 
tighten loopholes in the law can further balance between 
legitimate claims of innovators and interests of society. 
Individual governments also have a role to play in mediating 
this tension between Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust 
Law, each in their specific jurisdiction safeguarding that 
regulatory regimes are poised to protect the interests of the 
technology transferring licensors, while enabling the 
maximum accrual of the benefits of innovation to the 
consumers world-wide.
Beside availability of legal channels, it is fair to expect that 
companies will abide by an ethos of their profession. One of 
the Bayer company’s early presidents, George Merck, is 
quoted with the following: ‘We try to never forget that 
medicine is for the people. It is not for the profits. The profits 
follow, and if we have remembered that, they have never 
failed to appear. The better we remember it, the larger they 
have been.’ In light of some of the discussion, the quote 
might sound ironic. It is hoped that it loses some of its irony.
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PEDRO A. VILLARREAL
22 September, 2016 at 18:31 (Edit) — Reply
Thank you, Dhiraj Duraiswami, for this compelling post on 
a hot-button issue, and for providing an International Law 
angle often overlooked. 
I agree with the premises, insofar as it is a matter that 
requires tending to the currently existing legal loopholes 
in Intellectual Property law. The argument related to the 
profit-ratio of companies is a difficult one to make since, 
in my opinion, it could require both an accounting 
exercise as well as empirical evidence related to the 
pharmaceutical industry’s active ingredient production, 
which is not always available. Nevertheless, I think the 
argument related to ongoing practices such as artificially 
extending patent rights (a.k.a. “evergreening”) is sound as 
it is, insofar as there is hardly any convincing justification, 
economic or otherwise, on behalf of maintaining such 
regulatory artifices. This is where legal reforms can -and 
even, should- play a role in fixing the conundrum you 
describe with detail in the post. 
That being said, I would like to briefly mention the 
promising -albeit still under dispute- case of price-
PREVIOUS POST
Responsibility-sharing for refugees (2) 
NEXT POST
Is there a positive obligation on Russia to legalise 
same-sex unions under the European Convention on 
Human Rights? 

regulation done in Colombia for cancer drug Imatinib. 
After (failed) negotiations with Novartis, the patent-
holder, the Ministry of Health of Colombia declared this 
drug to be of “public interest”. This will allow setting its 
price through the National Commission on Pricing on 
Drugs and Medical Devices and by using a different 
methodology, which will “simulate conditions of 
competition in the market” (quote from the Administrative 
resolution, available at 
https://www.minsalud.gov.co/sites/rid/Lists/Biblioteca
Digital/RIDE/DE/DIJ/Resolucion-2475-de-2016.pdf) . 
Price setting will be effectuated without requiring the 
acquiesence of Novartis. If this initiave is successful, I 
believe it will show how current legal mechanisms, such as 
the one from TRIPs, can be used for circumventing 
monopolistic practices that restrain access to medicines 
in an unjustifiable manner. Of course, the issue is always 
how to determine when this is “justified” or not. In my 
opinion, there is no visible possibility of drafting a 
definitive legal criterion that overcomes the need for a 
case-by-case analysis. 
Best regards
DHIRAJ DURAISWAMI
2 October, 2016 at 02:50 (Edit) — Reply
Thanks Pedro Villarreal, for your response which is 
pertinent and much appreciated.
The mention you made of the case of Novartis’ cancer 
drug Imatinib being subjected to price-regulation by the 
government is definitely a good case in point, which aims 
to bring the benefit of life saving drugs to its people and 
also balance the equitable rights of the drug company. 
Interestingly the long drawn case of this drug in Colombia 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/us-novartis-colombia-
cancer-idUSKCN0YV2NT) indeed started with its sale 
without patent protection since 2003 as Glivec or Gleevec 
till 2012 when its high prices sparked competition from 
generic producers at nearly 200 percent cheaper prices. 
The company only obtained a patent there with the 
intervention of a Columbian court order in 2012, followed 
by the debate of using the option of compulsory licensing 
(http://www.wsj.com/articles/colombia-threatens-to-
override-novartiss-patent-on-gleevec-1463770091) which 
was opposed by groups and the governments of the US 
and Switzerland and hence the controversial decision by 
the Colombian government. This could very well set a 
precedent for other nations to adopt this mechanism on a 
selective basis to control arbitrary and rising costs of such 
key drugs.
Interesting, while other countries like Thailand, Brazil and 
India have adopted compulsory licensing to counter such 
high priced and crucial drugs, this very same drug Gleevec 
was the subject of seven-year battle when initially denied 
a patent in India for technical reasons by the Patent 
Office, and ended with the refusal being upheld by the 
Indian Supreme Court in 2013 
(http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?
filename=40212). The patent law in India as amended in 
2005 to comply with TRIPs also has given the ability to 
prevent “evergreening” that has been used from time to 
time. This evidences effective statutory action to close 
legal loopholes being exploited by large drug companies.
Also interesting is that, in the US Gleevec has lost its 
patent protection and even as generic drugs have been 
introduced in the market the price has only fallen 
modestly (http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2016/02/01/465139901/generic-gleevec-imatinib-
savings-will-be-modest). Even doctors including a 
developer of the drug had criticized the high prices and 
the questionable tactics adopted even after the recouping 
of costs. So additionally using a price regulatory 
mechanism within a statutory framework to receive and 
act upon complaints from and on behalf of patient 
consumers could help to supplement other courses of 
action.
PEDRO A. VILLARREAL
4 October, 2016 at 15:58 (Edit) — Reply
Thank you very much for your very thorough reply. 
It is definitely illustrative to look at the particularly 
convoluted case of Gleevec, as it is a matter that 
transcends an individual country. The comparative 
perspective you provide is useful for tackling this 
issue.
I would only have one thing to add, followed by two 
questions:
One of the biggest factual challenges for 
compulsory licenses to work, is to actually find a 
company able and willing to undertake the 
production of a particular drug. This option may 
not always be available. We could think of the 
problem with Benznidazole, which is used to treat 
Chagas disease. The original patent-holder had 
ceded the rights to produce this medication, which 
from then onwards would be retaken by a public 
laboratory in Brazil (it should be stressed this was 
not compulsory licensing, but rather an agreement 
with the patent-holder). Afterwards, the 
governmental laboratory in charge of producing 
the active pharmaceutical ingredient fell short of 
the demand, blaming it on a back-and-forth 
disagreements with the Ministry of Health and 
another private drug producer. Some years later, 
this initiative was adopted by an Argentinian 
public-private partnership. However, the shortage 
of medication almost put the whole campaign 
against Chagas disease to a halt. In my opinion, 
these and other similar examples show how there 
are still economic and logistical challenges for 
devising alternatives to intellectual property-based 
monopolies.
On another issue, you mention how the price of 
Gleevec in the United States has not been 
substantially reduced, even though there is already 
an “open market”. Would this mostly be due to high 
demand of the product? Or is there another 
possible explanation on why this is the case? In any 
case, I can see why you argue that price regulatory 
mechanisms would work for these situations.
Lastly, on the matter of recouping costs, would 
there be public records clearly showing when the 
initial investment has been considered to be fully 
covered? As this might be a yardstick for assessing 
when profits exceed the justification for 
maintaining the current length of patent protection 
regimes.
DHIRAJ DURAISWAMI
1 November, 2016 at 08:03 (Edit) — Reply
I apologize for the delay in responding and would start by 
responding to your questions first.
As to the persistence of high prices for drugs like Gleevec 
in the US, I would opine that it is a consequence of both 
the high demand for critical and lifesaving drugs 
combined with the aftereffects of the monopolistic impact 
that had caused the high prices in the first place. As can 
be seen from the same report quoted earlier there is only 
a single manufacturer (Sun Pharmaceuticals based out of 
India) making the generic version of the revolutionary 
cancer pill for the US market. Also the pill that was initially 
launched by Novartis in 2001 to greatly advance the 
treatment of myeloid leukemia specifically and improve 
cancer therapy overall, has since then be approved for use 
against all other types of leukemia and blood cancers, rare 
skin cancers and certain gastrointestinal tumors. The 
launch of the generic imatinib drug hopefully by other 
companies would lead to a drop in prices, which for 
obvious reasons has not been drastic as yet while 
government approvals and regulatory challenges would 
also have to be overcome. Also to be kept in context is 
how the prices for one pill of the branded and protected 
Gleevec had risen from about $92.74 in 2010 to $179.93 in 
2014 according to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services who spent about $1 billion in 2014 on Gleevec.
(https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/Dashboard/Medicare-Drug
Spending/Drug_Spending_Dashboard.html). This ‘price 
inertia’ would slowly but surely be overcome in time as 
more generic competitors appear on the scene.
As to the question of availability of public records to show 
if the costs of initial investment have been recouped, I 
guess there would not be any unless regulations are in 
force that arguably can require such transparency that 
would be in conflict with the industry’s interests. There 
are various other factors in play such as role that industry 
plays in funding research, the promotion of alternate 
drugs, common pooling of costs and extending patent 
protection that would act as barriers to promote such 
transparency.
Finally, as in the case of Benznidazole it is obvious that the 
economic and logistical challenges that you rightly point 
out exist and would persistently scuttle efforts to fight 
disease and death. It is more interesting to note that this 
case specifically reveals how some of the same actors and 
corporate greed inspired motives are involved as was 
pointed out initially. 
(http://arstechnica.com/science/2016/02/in-
comeback-bid-shkrelis-old-company-gets-ok-to-buy-
life-saving-drug/).
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